Mathematical Finance Seminar
Date
Time
16:15
Location:
HUB; RUD 25; 1.115
Kristoffer Andersson (University of Verona)

Exponential convergence of fictitious-play FBSDEs in finite player stochastic differential games

We study finite player stochastic differential games on possibly bounded spatial domains. The equilibrium problem is formulated through the dynamic programming principle, leading to a coupled Nash system of HJB equations and, in probabilistic form, to a corresponding Nash FBSDE with stopping at the first exit from the parabolic domain (covering both boundary and terminal conditions). The main focus of the talk is the analysis of a fictitious-play procedure applied at the level of FBSDEs. At each iteration, a player solves a best-response FBSDE against fixed opponent strategies, giving rise to a sequence of fictitious-play FBSDEs. We show that this sequence converges exponentially fast to the Nash FBSDE. In unbounded domains, this holds under a small-time assumption; in bounded domains, exponential convergence is obtained for arbitrary horizons under additional regularity conditions. For completeness, we also discuss how the fictitious-play FBSDE is approximated by a numerically tractable surrogate FBSDE, which itself converges exponentially to the fictitious-play equation. Since the surrogate FBSDE admits a standard time-discrete approximation of order 1/2, this provides a transparent overall error structure for the numerical approximation of the Nash FBSDE. We conclude with representative numerical illustrations of the full approximation scheme.

Mathematical Finance Seminar
Date
Time
17:15
Location:
HUB; RUD 25; 1.115
Alex Tse (University College London)

Portfolio Selection in Contests

In an investment contest with incomplete information, a finite number of agents dynamically trade assets with idiosyncratic risk and are rewarded based on the relative ranking of their terminal portfolio values. We explicitly characterize a symmetric Nash equilibrium of the contest and rigorously verify its uniqueness. The connection between the reward structure and the agents’ portfolio strategies is examined. A top-heavy payout rule results in an equilibrium portfolio return distribution with high positive skewness, which suffers from a large likelihood of poor performance. Risky asset holding increases when competition intensifies in a winner-takes all contest. This is joint work with Yumin Lu.

Mathematical Finance Seminar
Date
Time
16:15
Location:
HUB; RUD 25; 1.115
Felix Höfer (Princeton U)

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Mathematical Finance Seminar
Date
Time
17:15
Location:
HUB; RUD 25; 1.115
Martin Keller-Ressel (TU Dresden)

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Mathematical Finance Seminar
Date
Time
16:15
Location:
HUB; RUD 25; 1.115
Xiaofei Shi (Toronto)

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Mathematical Finance Seminar
Date
Time
17:15
Location:
HUB; RUD 25; 1.115
Alessandro Bondi (Luiss University; Rome)

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Mathematical Finance Seminar
Date
Time
16:15
Location:
HUB; RUD 25; 1.115
Guido Gazzani (U Vienna)

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Mathematical Finance Seminar
Date
Time
17:15
Location:
HUB; RUD 25; 1.115
Beatrice Ongarato (TU Dresden)

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