We study finite player stochastic differential games on possibly bounded spatial domains. The equilibrium problem is formulated through the dynamic programming principle, leading to a coupled Nash system of HJB equations and, in probabilistic form, to a corresponding Nash FBSDE with stopping at the first exit from the parabolic domain (covering both boundary and terminal conditions). The main focus of the talk is the analysis of a fictitious-play procedure applied at the level of FBSDEs. At each iteration, a player solves a best-response FBSDE against fixed opponent strategies, giving rise to a sequence of fictitious-play FBSDEs. We show that this sequence converges exponentially fast to the Nash FBSDE. In unbounded domains, this holds under a small-time assumption; in bounded domains, exponential convergence is obtained for arbitrary horizons under additional regularity conditions. For completeness, we also discuss how the fictitious-play FBSDE is approximated by a numerically tractable surrogate FBSDE, which itself converges exponentially to the fictitious-play equation. Since the surrogate FBSDE admits a standard time-discrete approximation of order 1/2, this provides a transparent overall error structure for the numerical approximation of the Nash FBSDE. We conclude with representative numerical illustrations of the full approximation scheme.
Mathematical Finance Seminar
Date
Time
16:15
Location:
HUB; RUD 25; 1.115
Kristoffer Andersson (University of Verona)
Exponential convergence of fictitious-play FBSDEs in finite player stochastic differential games
Mathematical Finance Seminar
Date
Time
17:15
Location:
HUB; RUD 25; 1.115
Alex Tse (University College London)
Portfolio Selection in Contests
In an investment contest with incomplete information, a finite number of agents dynamically trade assets with idiosyncratic risk and are rewarded based on the relative ranking of their terminal portfolio values. We explicitly characterize a symmetric Nash equilibrium of the contest and rigorously verify its uniqueness. The connection between the reward structure and the agents’ portfolio strategies is examined. A top-heavy payout rule results in an equilibrium portfolio return distribution with high positive skewness, which suffers from a large likelihood of poor performance. Risky asset holding increases when competition intensifies in a winner-takes all contest. This is joint work with Yumin Lu.
Mathematical Finance Seminar
Date
Time
16:15
Location:
HUB; RUD 25; 1.115
Felix Höfer (Princeton U)
tba
Mathematical Finance Seminar
Date
Time
17:15
Location:
HUB; RUD 25; 1.115
Martin Keller-Ressel (TU Dresden)
tba
Mathematical Finance Seminar
Date
Time
16:15
Location:
HUB; RUD 25; 1.115
Xiaofei Shi (Toronto)
tba
Mathematical Finance Seminar
Date
Time
17:15
Location:
HUB; RUD 25; 1.115
Alessandro Bondi (Luiss University; Rome)
tba
Mathematical Finance Seminar
Date
Time
16:15
Location:
HUB; RUD 25; 1.115
Guido Gazzani (U Vienna)
tba
Mathematical Finance Seminar
Date
Time
17:15
Location:
HUB; RUD 25; 1.115
Beatrice Ongarato (TU Dresden)